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Abstract— The role of philosophy in nation building is 
hardly given the recognition it deserves in the African 
society. In this regard, philosophers are often seen as those 
who see problems where none exist, rather than people who 
inspire critical thinking. Yet, the role of philosophy in 
nation building cannot be dismissed with a wave of hand. 
The focus of this paper is basically to establish the 
relevance of existentialist philosophy to national 
development. To this end, we situate our discourse within a 
particular African context. The African world view would 
be discussed mainly from the context of the Igbo world 
view. This is the crux of the whole work. To this effect, the 
full implication of the Afro-existential approach will unfold 
as the work unfolds. One branch of philosophy that has 
made waves in various disciplines is existentialism. This 
paper is therefore an attempt to establish the relevance of 
existentialist philosophy to national development, with a 
particular focus on Nigeria. It understands existentialism as 
a trend in philosophy that lays emphasis on man’s existence 
with regard to such themes as 
individual freedom and choice, and the individual creating 
meaning in a meaningless universe. In this connection, it 
examines the role of the Afro-existential discourse as a new 
approach in African philosophy. It addresses such questions 
as, why is Nigeria underdeveloped. Do we have to continue 
looking for historical forces or factors to blame? What can 
the philosopher and the existential discourse contribute to 
the development of Nigeria? It concludes that, confronted 
with the underdeveloped state of Nigeria, the existentialists 
do not overly ignore history. However, they are more 
concerned with the present situation and the choices tha t 
confront us as individuals. Making the right choices and 
taking the right steps today is therefore the way 
philosophers would establish their relevance through the 
existential discourse. 




The term development, in a layman’s understanding, is 
improvement. The Cambridge Dictionary defines 
development as “the process in which someone or 
something grows or changes and becomes more advanced.” 
More technically, it refers to improvement in a country’s 
economic and social conditions, or improvements in the 
way of managing an area’s natural and human resources so 
as to create wealth and improve people’s living standards 
(Shah, 2017, para. 1). Seers (1967) outline a number of 
conditions that should lead to the realization of the 
potentials of the human person. These, in a sense, would be 
indices of a developed society. They include (1) The 
capacity to obtain physical necessities, with particular 
reference to food (2) A job, which may or may not be a paid 
job (3) Equality (4) Participation in government (5) 
Belonging to a truly independent (economically and 
politically) nation (6) Adequate educational levels  
The Nigerian society is a political contraption of Lord 
Frederick Lugard. Prior to the 1914 amalgamation and the 
coining of that appellation by Flora Shaw, what existed 
were various ethnic nationalities. Nigeria, as a nation, is 
located in West Africa, with a human population estimated 
at about 188,462,640 in 2016.  It is deemed the 7th most 
populous country in the world, occupying an area of 
356,669 square miles as the 32nd largest country in the 
world (www.nationfacts.net/nigeria). Economically, Nigeria 
has relied almost solely on oil revenue which is largely 
controlled by a privileged few. In an oil rich country like 
Nigeria, the human development index is rated at 0.514, at 
152nd in the world as at 2015 (UNDP, 2015, p. 18). 
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II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENCE 
Existentialism, as a branch of philosophy, defies any clear-
cut definition. Many attempts at the definition have come 
off as either too brief and one-sided or too lengthy. In this 
regard, we shall only attempt a description of the term. 
Existentialism then is a philosophy that focuses more and 
lays emphasis on man’s  existence. It beams its light on such 
themes as individual freedom and choice. One common 
view of the existentialists is that man is thrown into an 
irrational universe.  Being so thrown into a meaningless or 
irrational universe the individual defines his or her own 
meaning in life. This is predominantly the view of the 
atheistic existentialist thinkers. There are also the theistic 
thinkers for whom belief in God bestows meaning upon the 
universe (Copleston, 1956, pp. 211-213). 
For the atheistic existentialists the fact that there is  no 
God or any other transcendent force creates a feeling of 
nothingness. The only way to counter this nothingness and 
subsequently create meaning in life is 
by embracing existence. Hence, existentialism focuses on 
living rather than making speculations about life. 
Existentialism has as its central thesis the notion that there 
is no ready-made, pre-existing human nature or essence. 
Each individual personality crystallizes through experience. 
Sartre, for instance, believes that since there is no fixed 
human nature, we are free to create ourselves , and 
subsequently we must take responsibility for what we make 
of ourselves (Simpson, 2016, para. 5). Sartre writes in this 
regard that “man first of all exists, encounters himself, 
surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If 
man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is 
because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything 
until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself” 
(Sartre, 1973, p. 28). The logic is that the realization that we 
create ourselves and that everything about us could be 
different robs us of the tendency to pass the buck. We are 
unable to push responsibility onto something or someone 
else. Hence, in Sartrean terms, we are left alone without 
excuse (Sartre, 1973, p. 34). 
Existentialism is of the view that individuals are free to 
make choices and decisions based on what appeals to them 
as meaningful rather than what is  rational. For Kierkegaard, 
for instance, rationality is a mechanism humans use to 
counter their existential anxiety; that is their fear of being in 
the world. Similarly, rationality is for Sartre a form of “bad 
faith,” an attempt by the self to impose structure on 
a fundamentally irrational and random world of phenomena. 
This bad faith poses a hindrance to our discovery of 
meaning in freedom, and confines us within everyday 
experience. 
Existentialism has often been studied by focusing on the 
themes commonly discussed by the existentialists. We shall 
highlight some of these themes to guide our study in this 
paper. 
a. Philosophy as a way of life 
The existentialists do not conceive of philosophy as an 
effort geared towards investigating and understanding the 
self or the world, nor do they see it as a special occupation 
undertaken by a select few. It is rather an integral part of 
life. They do not object to there being professional 
philosophers who develop an elaborate set of methods and 
concepts. However, they believe that one who has not 
acquired a technical knowledge of philosophy can still live 
a life ruled by philosophy. Socrates, for instance, is today 
acclaimed a philosopher, but he never was a professional 
philosopher. He could be described as just trying to make 
sense out of nonsense. His intent was to instil a sense of the 
good life in people. In this sense he could pass for an 
existentialist.  The professional philosophers would focus 
on propounding ideas and principles about life while the 
existentialists focus on engaging with life as it unfolds. In 
this regard, Kierkegaard, for example, believes that the 
fundamental truths of one’s existence are not 
representations in terms of ideas, propositions or symbols 
the meaning of which can be separated from their origin. 
They are rather lived, felt and acted in the immediate 
(Burnham, 2018, para. 5). The philosopher is an insider to 
life, an actor. 
b. Anxiety and Authenticity 
Anxiety, angst or anguish is the recognition of the fact that 
man is a being on its own or abandoned in the universe, as 
the case may be. He is without a purpose or an essence. 
Other nuances may also apply (e.g. Kierkegaard – 
irrelevance of rational thought, Heidegger – uniqueness of 
human existence). 
Anxiety is closely related to authenticity. One who 
discovers one’s thrownness either embraces the reality and 
lives it or engages in denial or false hope. An authentic 
being is the one who lives in accordance with his nature. 
For Kierkegaard, this is achieved through a leap of faith. 
For Heidegger, it is achieved through the existential choices 
of Dasein. For Buber, Marcel and Berdyaev, it is in 
communion and intersubjectivity. For Sartre, man is 
condemned to freedom and must choose resolutely even 
when there is no basis for the choices. Refusal to choose is 
bad faith (inauthenticity). The earlier Camus locates 
authenticity in the rejection of suicide, whether 
philosophical or physical, even amidst the absurdity of 
existence (Lescoe, 1974, p. 12). 
c. Freedom 
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Freedom is also closely related to the concept of anguish. It 
is partially “defined by the isolation of my decisions from 
any determination by a deity, or by previously existent 
values or knowledge” (Burnham, 2018, para. 9). Freedom 
involves the liberty to choose one’s actions and what to 
make of one’s life and world as well as the responsibility 
for these choices and actions. For the existentialists, 
especially the atheists, man has absolute freedom to become 
what he wants and his responsibility too is absolute.  
d. Situatedness 
The existentialists conceive of freedom as situated. This 
absolute freedom of man is always exercised in particular 
contexts. His freedom is determined or limited by his body 
and its characteristics, his circumstances in a historical 
world, as well as his past. This situatedness makes freedom 
meaningful. A celebration of freedom that tends to ignore 
the context becomes either naive or illusory. In other words, 
man is absolutely free but not free to live in a fool’s 
paradise. 
e. Existence 
The existence in question is  human existence. In this 
connection, Nietzsche and Sartre conceive the human being 
as all and only what that being does. For Gabriel Marcel, 
existence is participation in the life of others or the 
community where man perceives himself as a being among 
beings. 
f. Irrationality/Absurdity 
Absurdity is a common theme among the existentialists. It 
has various nuances, but for many of the existentialists it 
suggests that nature is without any design or reason for 
existing. Although the physical science makes attempts at 
explaining the universe, it ends up mystifying it all the 
more, in the view of Albert Camus. Thus, the achievements 
of the natural sciences also empty nature of value and 
meaning since the scientifically described cosmos cannot 
answer our questions concerning value or meaning (Lescoe, 
1974, p. 355; Burnham, 2018, para. 13). Absurdity is 
therefore a part of life.  Another important sense of the 
absurdity is that, in Sartrean conception, in becoming 
myself I must be what I am not.  Any attempt to escape this 
absurdity leads to bad faith. 
g. The Crowd 
While most of the existentialists conceive of a healthy 
means of associating with others as coesse (Marcel), I-thou 
(Buber), Being-with (Heidegger), solidarity (later Camus), 
etc, they all abhor the idea of an individual being lost in a 
group as a de-individuated or faceless individual. This is a 
manifestation of inauthenticity. Such individual accepts 
values from others uncritically instead of forming them 
authentically in freedom and anxiety. Such is the band 
wagon mentality.   
These themes are of great importance to the existential 
discourse and will feature prominently in the discussion of 
the Afro-existential approach. 
 
III. THE AFRO-EXIS TENTIAL VIEW OF THE 
HUMAN PERSON 
The African worldview is basically existential. By this is 
meant that the African focuses on existence rather than 
speculating about life and the world. Hence, we argue that 
for the African too, existence precedes essence. This is seen 
in the personal Igbo names Ndubuisi (life is primary) and 
Ndu ka aku (life supersedes wealth), and in the proverbs: 
Nwa mkpi si ka ahapu ofo uto gooro ya ofo ndu n’ihi na 
onye di ndu ga-etoriri uto (The he-goat requests that people 
wish him life first instead of growth because one who is 
alive must grow), and Ma onwu egbughi ji eji chu aja, o ga-
epuriri ome (If the sacrificial yam remains alive, it must 
germinate/make something out of its life). The African does 
not really speculate about life or the world, substance, 
categories, matter or form. Whatever discourse he engages 
in must have a bearing to his quality of existence. Hence 
even when he talks about the unseen realities such as God 
and the other beings in the African pantheon, as well as 
ancestors and other unseen realities, he talks of them as they 
impact on the quality of the human life. This human life or 
existence for the African is necessarily communalistic. 
The idea of African communalism resonates in the 
academic circle. The idea suggests that Africans emphasize 
community living. It is also often understood to suggest, 
wrongly though, that the individual is swallowed up in the 
community and has no distinct life (Onah et al, 2016, p. 
225) whereas existentialism lays emphasis on the 
individual. What then is the place of the individual in the 
traditional African society? Does he really have a distinct 
life? Is he free? Has he a voice? Or are his voice and 
concerns suppressed in the society? Are his rights and 
privileges preserved or are they sacrificed at the altar of 
communalistic concerns? The afro-existentialist view 
suggests that communalism added to the quality of life of 
the individual in the traditional society. We shall examine 
this existential outlook briefly here. 
The traditional Igbo people, like other African tribes, lived 
in communities which formed the bedrock of existence in 
Africa. These communities were made up of basically 
descendants of common ancestors. These existed not just as 
a conglomeration of people sharing a particular 
geographical space, but also as a union of people sharing 
their lives together (Onah et al, 2016, p. 226). For Edeh 
(1985) the traditional Igbo community is “a societal set-up 
in which there is an intimate face-to-face interaction. 
Relationship is on a personal, human basis as distinguished 
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from the predominantly impersonal relationship that exists 
in today’s urban society where everyone minds his or her 
own business” (p. 56).  Hence, the sharing of the basic 
conditions of a common life constitutes the bedrock of the 
Igbo community. Such a community is made up of families 
and kindred that come together to form a village. They are 
thus united by a common language, culture, and thought 
pattern. In such a community each member had his rights 
respected. On his part, the individual knew that he had 
responsibilities to the community. He earned his position in 
the community through hard work. 
In the traditional Igbo community, there was a show of 
mutual concern by almost every member of the community. 
This could be as a result of the “we” feeling that pervaded 
the traditional society or simply the knowledge that what 
happens to one member of the community would eventually 
affect me. For instance, an Igbo adage says, onye huru 
okuko ebe o ji ukwu abo nsi ya chuo ya maka na o maghi 
onye ga-ata ukwu ya (One who sees a fowl scattering faeces 
with its legs should chase it away because it is not certain 
who will eventually eat the legs). In this connection, 
Ezedike (1995) paraphrases K. C. Anyanwu thus: “there is 
nothing like a solitary individual in the African (Igbo) 
cultural scheme of reality owing to the belief that all forces 
are perpetually in interaction with one another and 
interpenetrating each other” (p. 246).  This is not far from 
Mbiti’s (1969) understanding of the African communal life 
as “I am because we are and since we are, therefore I am” 
(p. 108). This suggests that the traditional community, 
though acting as a unit, was made up of individuals. It was 
individuals that made the community possible. Yet they 
were not isolated individuals because communalism is 
“essentially the spiritual communion of a society; the spirit 
of being one community, of being one with one’s 
community, of belonging fundamentally to one another and 
to the community; the consciousness that instinctively 
orients my search for meaning in life to the appreciation or 
valuation of the community” (Odimegwu, 2007, p. 7). 
Essentially, as Agbakwuo (2013) opines, “for the Africans, 
to be is to-be-with and the purpose of existing, that being-
with, is to ensure a continuous enhancement of life and its 
optimal transmission” (p. 16).  
This social set up derives its meaning from a sense of 
communion which is the animating principle. From the 
above it is discernible that the community is constituted by 
various individuals who share a common life and heritage. 
Nevertheless, the community is prioritized in the sense that 
the needs of the community supersedes and is ranked above 
the needs of the individuals, even though the individuals are 
the actors in the community (Onah et al, 2016, p. 226).What 
this implies is that the individual works strenuously to 
realize his personal goals and optimize his abilities, but he 
never goes outside the boundaries set by community 
concerns. He “orders all his efforts and aspirations in the 
light of the whole” (Ezedike, 1995, p.  246).  
In the traditional Igbo society, an individual was valued 
according his personal achievements, his relationships and 
his contribution to the society. It was a well known fact that 
otu osisi anaghi agho ohia (a tree does not make a forest) 
and that otu aka anaghi eke ngwuwu  (one hand cannot tie a 
parcel). Everyone also understood that onye lie onwe ya, otu 
aka ya aputa n’elu ili (if a person buries himself, one of his 
hands will appear above the grave). In other words, 
however wealthy one was in material goods, one needed to 
be in communion with other members of the community 
because igwe bu ike (there is strength in communion). 
Development, in the traditional igbo society, was driven by 
this conviction that the way forward was to move with the 
community.  
 
IV. AN AFRO-EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN 
SOCIETY 
Colonization, in our view, is the worst thing that happened 
to Africa, in general, and Nigeria, in particular. It was a 
fight against the African and his existential consciousness. 
Founded as it was on racism, colonization employed every 
possible means to prove the superiority of the white over 
the black race. To achieve this, the colonizers had to put in 
action what Achebe (1989) describes as the desire “in 
Western psychology to set Africa up as a foil to Europe, as 
a place of negations at once remote and vaguely familiar, in 
comparison with which Europe’s own state of spiritual 
grace will manifest” (p. 3). Today, colonialism subsists in 
neo-colonialism. 
To continue in this trend of blaming colonization and the 
West is, however, to abandon the existentialist thrust of this 
paper. Granted that the colonial masters created what I dare 
to call strange bedfellows through the 1914 amalgamation, 
the existentialist would ask, what do I make of this entity 
that has been created? We are now one Nigeria, so what 
next? What is the way forward in this geographical space 
into which I have been conscripted? This is where the Afro-
existential approach to development comes in. The Afro-
existentialist approach is resonant with themes common to 
both existentialism and the African worldview. These 
themes would be discernible in the following passages.  
The first issue we shall address is the role of the Afro-
existential discourse which could be developed as an 
approach in African philosophy. According to Marx (1947), 
“philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point is to change” (p. 199). The Afro -
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existential approach believes that philosophy should be a 
way of life. Philosophy should add to the value of life by 
discussing things relevant to the improvement of the quality 
life. Over and above this, philosophy should be practical. 
Russell (1961) in the preface to his History of Western 
Philosophy contends that philosophy has always been a part 
and parcel of the life of any community. Philosophy is not 
just an empty chatter of an otherwise idle group of people, 
or endless argument about anything and everything. It is an 
enterprise that has a bearing on the life of the society. To 
this extent, “philosophers are both effects and causes: 
effects of their social circumstances and of the politics and 
institutions of their time; causes (if they are fortunate) of 
beliefs which mould the politics and institutions  of later 
ages” (Russel, 1961, p. 7). Philosophers have the task of 
shaping the future of the society whose philosophy has 
shaped their thoughts. If Europe was able to develop itself 
and reach out to dominate other parts of the world, it is 
because philosophers through the ages shaped their 
perception of reality. If other philosophers whose thoughts 
were considered empty speculations by the existentialists 
were able to achieve this, then the existential discourse 
should be properly channelled in Nigeria to achieve a home 
grown development. 
A major problem of the Nigerian today is that he lives a 
borrowed, and therefore, inauthentic life. Colonial 
education was one of the major tools used to disorient 
Nigerians. Genuine development begins in the mind as 
ideas . Hence, the aphorism, “ideas rule the world.” There is 
therefore a need to develop the mind of the average 
Nigerian. There is a need to use education in contemporary 
times to decolonize the minds of Nigerians. This could be 
done through a well-articulated educational curriculum 
based on indigenous philosophy of education relevant to our 
cultural milieu, or that which is consistent with our 
traditional values or cultural matrix. The average Nigerian 
is neither here nor there. Granted that the western brand of 
education offers opportunities to job seekers, it was 
designed both in structure and curriculum to disorient the 
African mind or existential consciousness. The result is seen 
in such experiences as narrated by Achebe (1989): “Three 
or four weeks ago my wife, who teaches English in a boys’ 
school, asked a pupil why he wrote about winter when he 
meant the harmattan. He said the other boys would call him 
a bushman if he does such a thing!” (p. 44). That is to say 
that colonial/western education teaches the African to be 
ashamed of his identity; his past, and his environment 
which he is helpless to change in any remarkable way. The 
Afro-existential approach should aim at teaching the 
individual to live authentically. Only then can we think and 
work together to achieve an authentically African 
development. 
The western existentialists’ understanding of freedom is 
also not far removed from the African notion of freedom. I 
am free to make of myself what I will, and I take 
responsibility for what I make of myself. The African 
notion of freedom is limited by this responsibility which is 
to the community. The African is absolutely free within the 
community. The absoluteness is limited by community 
concerns. According to Onwu (2002), “individual existence 
and freedom are appreciated, but they are delicately 
balanced with the underlying philosophy of life-in-
community” (section 4.5, para. 1). This type of freedom 
could then be described as freedom within rather than 
freedom from the community. It is conscious of the fact that 
one person’s freedom ends where the other person’s 
freedom begins. This is because, basically, “Africans do not 
see themselves as individuals living independently, but 
rather as people living in a community interdependently, 
with communal responsibilities” (Agbakwuo, 2013, p. 162). 
The notion of absolute freedom which the Nigerian 
politicians seem to operate with is part of our undoing. They 
seem to forget that they are responsible, not only to 
themselves but also to the larger society. This seems to be 
another effect of the amalgamation where people now 
struggle to have a share of the national cake without care for 
how the cake is to be sustained so that it could reach 
everybody. The Afro-existential approach to development 
would involve a re-orientation bordering on African 
communalistic notion of freedom. 
The Afro-existential approach embraces a contextual 
approach to development. Nku di na mba na-eghere mba nri 
(the firewood in a particular clime serves for their cooking) 
is a popular Igbo aphorism. While we think globally, there 
is a need to act contextually. This contextual approach 
stresses the need to focus our developmental effort on our 
peculiar situation in Nigeria. This would be helped by the 
development of independent thought. No person can be 
considered mature; that is, fully developed, without the 
capacity of independent thought. As long as one still 
accepts uncritically whatever one’s parents or significant 
others tells one, one cannot be said to be mature. It is only 
when one can reflect independently on those things and 
accept or reject them on the strength of critical reflection 
that one can be said to be mature. It is against this 
background that we argue alongside Serequeberhan (1994) 
that “we contemporary (Nigerians) need to confront the 
question of our ‘maturity’ at its most fundamental level – on 
the plane of philosophic reflection” (p. 14). Philosophic 
reflection, we argue, is a pointer to mental independence. 
This mental independence, which the afro-existential 
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approach promotes, is a prelude to contextual development. 
Independent thought would help us identify and prioritize 
our real needs, and develop accordingly.  
Since philosophy engenders a critical attitude, the Afro-
existential approach must engender a reflective action. It is 
a call to question the unquestionable; to challenge the status 
quo. It raises such questions as: Why are we backward? 
Why has the abundance of natural resources not resulted in 
a developed economy? Why have countries less blessed by 
nature faired far better than we have in Nigeria? The first 
obvious truth we discover here is that no one can develop 
who has no capacity for self-thought. Hence we discover 
that “the pure and simple reason for [Nigeria’s] 
backwardness in recent times, despite the fact of political 
independence, remains that the [Nigerian] has refused to 
think for himself…” (Emedolu, 2010, p. 13). If the political 
elite do appreciate the need for critical self-thought, why 
would they willingly collaborate with external forces to 
keep their dear country perpetually underdeveloped? And if 
the masses really think for themselves, why would they 
worship the same people who oppress them? Hence, the 
major solution to the problem of underdevelopment in 
Nigeria is what Emedolu (2010) describes as “a systematic 
education in mental independence” (p. 13). This is what we 
refer to as the development of a critical attitude.  This has 
been the age-old secret of national development.  
Critical self-thought is both a sign of, and a stimulus for, 
development. Self-thought does not imply a rejection of any 
idea because it is not original to you. It is first of all 
considering Davidson’s (1992) thought-provoking 
questions: “But why then adopt models from those very 
countries or systems that have oppressed and despised you? 
Why not modernize from the models of your own history; 
or invent new models?” (p. 19). These questions are very 
significant because the answer or answers provided show 
the level of maturity in self-thought. There may be reasons 
to consciously and voluntarily borrow models that have 
been tested and trusted. After all, some countries have 
achieved a developed economy by technology transfer. 
There is however no reason to swallow hook, line and 
sinker such models as have been practically forced down 
your throat. Even in the case of voluntary borrowing, such 
models have to be applied critically because certain 
conditions may facilitate or hinder their proper functioning. 
While inventing one’s own model or modernizing models 
from history cannot be faulted, borrowing already 
successful models critically may make for faster progress. 
This is apparently what Nwodo (2004) refers to as a higher 
synthesis; a situation where the best of two cultures or 
models could be extracted and highlighted. You have been 
doing something in a rather crude and slow way and you get 
an idea of modernizing it and lessening the hassles 
involved; that is progress. Both Hegel and Marx recognize 
development in apparent opposition such that a new idea or 
reality challenges the existing idea or reality; the two are 
then resolved in a new and higher idea or reality. The 
process goes through thesis and antithesis to produce a 
synthesis. This is opposed to the idea of insisting on 
generating an indigenous model. An indigenous model is 
not out of place when that is possible but it does not rule out 
the idea of a customised borrowing. However, it must be 
noted that our condition in Nigeria is not helped by 
unhealthy rivalry among the various ethnic nationalities, 
interest groups, and professional bodies, to mention a few. 
Indigenous creativity is suppressed by every means, not 
excluding death. This has contributed in no small measure 
to the phenomenon of brain drain whereby those who are 
capable of critical self-thought and of generating novel 
ideas are lured away to where they are appreciated more. 
The implication is that we keep losing our intellectual assets 
to the developed nations where independent thought is 
appreciated.  
Another area this lack of contextualization manifests itself 
is the area of industrialization. We see that the much touted 
“oil fall” has not resulted in a developed economy or 
infrastructure. Not many industries have developed in 
Nigeria either. Even the agricultural sector which was part 
of the mainstay of the colonial economy in Nigeria and the 
post-independence Nigeria of the 1960s and 70s has been 
left comatose. The situation is such that Nigerian has relied 
heavily on importation; even of such things that Nigeria 
ordinarily produces. What is really not imported in Nigeria; 
from consumable farm products like rice, chicken and 
animal hides to automobiles? But Nigeria has several rice 
producing communities that could be boosted by 
mechanization and improved species. Achebe (1973) wrote 
that while he was growing up, probably in the 1940s, “to 
say that a product was Ibo-made was to brand it with the 
utmost inferiority” (p. 9). That is why, as Isichei (1976) 
corroborates, textiles made in Nsukka, for instance, would 
be branded “made in England” to have a market value (p. 
31). This trend has continued to this day. Few people 
believe in the authenticity of made-in-Nigeria goods. Some 
others who abhor them do so not on the basis of the 
authenticity, or otherwise, of the products but on the basis 
of class. They suppose it is below their dignity to use 
locally manufactured products. Some who patronize them 
are only constrained to do so. How can we develop with this 
mindset? We need to accept our existential realities, our 
facticity. 
Successive Nigerian governments have continuously 
sacrificed indigenous and contextual developmental 
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interests by a commitment to always seek foreign 
developmental aid instead of setting in motion an 
aggressive process of industrialization. This is so much so 
that there is hardly any major industry in Nigeria that is 
indigenous. Shell BP, for instance, and other foreign oil 
firms have continued the monopoly in oil explorations in 
Nigeria. To this end Nyerere (1968) asks, “Could we agree 
to leave the economy of our country in the hands of 
foreigners who would take the profits back to their 
countries?” (p. 25). But these are part of the terms of the 
aids. We need to develop critical self-thought. We need to 
reflect on our actions and inactions. Nigeria boasts of four 
oil refineries that have been moribund almost since their 
establishment, with the result that petroleum products are 
also part of the products Nigeria imports. How can a nation 
that does not produce its needs advance? In this way 
Nigeria has continued to enrich the developed economies by 
default while holding tenaciously to her learned 
helplessness. While we can blame the situation on a number 
of forces beyond what is evident to the common mind, the 
challenge of the Afro-existential approach is to take the 
responsibility and rise to the challenge. 
It bears repeating that the Afro-existential approach 
demands a mental revolution in Nigeria and the Nigerians. 
There is an urgent need to revolutionize the Nigerian 
mentality. In the words of Chinweizu (1978), “we need 
something like a communal mental bath, one in which we 
shall scrub the crud off one another’s backs…” (p. xx). It is 
something akin to a counter-brainwashing. In Achebe’s 
(1989) thinking, “here then is an adequate revolution … to 
help my society regain belief in itself and put away the 
complexes of the years of denigration and self-abasement. 
And it is essentially a question of education, in the best 
sense of that word” (p. 44). It demands an education that 
takes into consideration our situatedness. Nkrumah (1963) 
seems to be making this same point when he noted that “our 
philosophy must find its weapon in the environment and 
living conditions of the African people” (rpt. in Mutiso & 
Rohio, 1975, p. 644). The situation in question is that we 
have become disoriented. The traditional African was 
neither a loafer, a beggar, nor a swindler. He loved to 
produce his life. He was judged by what he produced. This 
was the basis of rewards in the community. To be 
recognized and given serious responsibilities in the 
community, one had to distinguish oneself by what one 
produces. Today, the situation has changed. Hard work is 
despised. People look for easy money and are given titles 
and accolades for just being rich, irrespective of the means. 
And then we have beggars under various pretexts littering 
the streets. The task of the existential discourse here is to 
initiate what Nietzsche would call the revaluation of values. 
Closely related to the foregoing is the idea of crowd 
mentality. The Afro-existential approach celebrates the 
quest of the traditional African to distinguish himself as an 
individual; to stand up in order to be counted. The 
individual was inseparable from the community, as it were. 
Nevertheless, he was not anonymous in a faceless crowd. 
The community was also not a crowd. In Nigeria today, 
everybody seems to be enveloped by the crowd mentality, 
the band wagon effect. The dictum is, “If you cannot beat 
them you join them.” And so we get lost in the crowd. 
People do things or refrain from doing things because others 
are doing or are not doing same, as the case may be. The 
Afro-existentialist approach abhors the crowd mentality or 
the de-individuated personality who has no capacity for 
critical self-thought.  
The Afro-existential discourse is also conscious of history. 
In that regard, the re-orientation it advocates has to deal 
with the history of African civilization. The colonial 
situation infected the African psyche with learned 
helplessness. According to Diop (1986), “the philosophy of 
the colonizer was to make it very clear that the colonized 
people could do nothing for themselves without the 
assistance of the colonizing people” (p. 349). The colonial 
education convinced the African that he was heading for 
extermination by hunger, ignorance, lack of technology, and 
what have you, until the white man appeared as the long-
awaited messiah. Hence, it was the “white man’s burden” to 
bring Africa up to speed with the rest of the world. To drop 
this learned helplessness, therefore, we need to go back to 
history to see that Africa was developing at its own pace 
before the colonial contact. Palmberg (1983), for instance, 
cites the documented amazement of some Dutch vis itors on 
the level of organization and development they saw in the 
city of Benin (p. 83). That was in the 15th century. 
According to Sartre (1963), “we only become what we are 
by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others 
have made of us” (p. 15). This is a refusal of my present 
situation as final.  The re-orientation would therefore be an 
honest attempt to show the Nigerian that, imperfect as his 
pre-colonial past may have been, it was not inglorious, and 
he did not lack dignity. It is the conviction of Nwodo (2004) 
that “once the [Nigerian] has recovered, has regained his 
dignity, self-respect and self-confidence, he is ready to 
invent a future for himself” (p. 234). This is because he 
believes, in line with Achebe, that “the African 
destiny/destination as a process starts with a recreation of 
the past” (p. 234). This is in line with the argument of 
Spady (1986) that “to avoid a deformed African personality 
one must be conversant with the full range of one’s 
ancestral past, not just to establish self-pride but to use it as 
the basis for constructing a modern civilization...” (p. 96).  
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Since this return to the African past is not just meant for one 
to glory in a lost past, the next step in this philosophical 
reorientation of the African consciousness is to ask: “where 
did we get it wrong?” Our conviction is that the traditional 
Africans got it wrong because they seemed to have lacked 
the critical attitude that propels technological advancement. 
The traditional African society apparently was an uncritical 
society. They made inventions probably out of necessity but 
such inventions were hardly improved upon so long as they 
tended to satisfy the original need they were meant to serve. 
For instance, Rodney (1972) maintains that Europe 
borrowed much of her nautical instrumentation from the 
North Africans (p. 98); but Europe went ahead to develop 
the technology and build ships while Africans remained at 
the level of canoes. Also Achebe (1989) cites the testimony 
of the British art historian, Frank Willet who describes the 
revolution an African art work had caused in Europe, 
influencing great European artists like Picasso and Matisse 
(p. 16). Yet such works go unnoticed in Africa. Europe may 
also have developed in this manner until the renaissance 
which eventually led to the enlightenment. Consequent 
upon the age of reason, every assumption was challenged in 
almost every field of learning. But Africa was not as 
fortunate. The Afro-existential discourse, therefore, has to 
champion this course.  
Since the excursion into the African past has furnished us 
with a civilization and with the bane of that civilization, the 
re-orientation now has a focus. The history we have 
explored should guide us in this re-orientation. Accordingly, 
Wilson (1993) asserts that “it is  through studying the 
history of our people that we come to understand ourselves 
as individuals and as a people.” And then “we have to use 
history as a means of reconstituting our personality and 
restructuring ourselves” (p. 54).  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The existentialist discourse or the Afro-existential approach, 
as the case may be, is, in a nutshell, a realistic philosophy. It 
gets itself engrossed with the existential realities of the 
individual, what confronts me in my present situation. It 
also concerns itself with the choices I make in my given 
situation and the implication(s) of such choices. The basic 
situation that we are confronted with in this discourse is the 
underdeveloped state of Nigeria. Who do we blame? 
Although the existentialists do not overly ignore history, 
they are concerned with my present situation and the 
choices that confront me. Hence, we must conclude by 
asserting that what has happened to you is not as important 
as what you make of it. We must make the right choices and 
take the right steps today as philosophers to establish our 
relevance through the existential discourse. 
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